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Abstract:  Governments  dislike  poorly  performing  public  firms  and  often  see  deregulation  and 
privatisation as a way to improve performance and social welfare. From a theoretical point of view poor 
performance may be due to information asymmetries between the informed public firm and the relatively 
uninformed regulator.
The point of view in the paper is that the information asymmetries that makes the regulator unable to 
achieve first best during regulation, is also the cause of deregulation and privatization failure. 
The effect on public firm incentives from introducing deregulation as a consequence from choosing a 
specific regulation contract is analysed.
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1. Introduction
The main problem with regulated public firms is the tendency of such firms to perform poorly compared 
to private market firms. The difference can be explained as being due to information asymmetries. The 
better informed firm is able to convince the regulator that providing large incentives is the best thing to do 
to boost its performance even though such action is not necessary. The result is that the firm receives too 
large transfers compared to what it would have, if the regulator was fully informed about the firm.
Governments dislike poorly performing public firms, they can become a liability to the government. They 
can become a financial  burden and in times when governments need to restrict  government spending 
governments would consider deregulating markets one of the ways to improve the situation.
Deregulating and privatising a public firm may be a way to solve these problems, but not necessarily a 
safe way to avoid political problems altogether. Deregulation and privatisation may create new political 
worries,  like  whether  the  deregulation  and  privatization  will  provide  lower  prices  and  better  social 
welfare. 
The pre- and post-deregulation and privatization problems are related in the sense that privatizing a public 
firm that seems to be inefficient,  may turn out not to be so in the deregulated market, if  information 
asymmetries characterises the relationship between the regulator and the firm. Depending on the realised 
level of competition in the deregulated market, the seemingly inefficient former public firm may turn out 
to be a market leader or even a monopolist in the deregulated market, resulting in higher prices and in 
turn prove to be a political  problem even in the deregulated market  as well.  It  is  thus important  for 
governments to get deregulation right the first time around. 
If information about the public firm, the regulated market or the probable deregulation market outcome is 
ascertain, regulators tend to do what they can to ensure that the deregulation become a success. This can 
be the use of transitional periods or conditional deregulation, in which the government announces that it 
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will turn to regulation to reduce any post-deregulation unwanted effects of the deregulation if such are 
realised. 
In this paper the link between regulation and deregulation is explored by proposing a system of regulation 
contracts that take into account both the public firm incentives during regulation as well as those arising 
from deregulation.
2. Some empirical studies
There exist a large number of cases of profitable privatised companies, which under state ownership made 
significant losses.1 At the same time it is also noticeable that many of these companies became profitable 
when introduced to  the prospect  of deregulation  and privatisation  while  they were still  in the public 
sector. When you compare pre- and post-privatisation profitability of public firms there does not seem to 
be  a  clear  link  between  post-privatisation  profitability  and  pre-privatisation  performance  and  the 
deregulation and privatisation goals of the government. 
In Leeds (1991) it is found that profitability  is higher after privatisation, but that it probably rose three 
years  before  the  actual  privatisation.  Moussios  (1994)  find  that  privatisation  failed  to  generate  a 
significant and lasting stimulus for lasting improved performance. Parker and Hartley (1991) find a weak 
relationship  between  privatisation  and  improved  profitability.  Domberger  (1993)  find  that  improved 
profitability appeared to be wholly unrelated to the privatization. And Green and Vogelsang (1991) find 
that  profitability  appeared  higher  after  privatisation,  but  the  timing  of  the  improvement  was  not 
necessarily related to either the announcement of the sale or the sale itself. In Price (1992) where the 
deregulation and privatization of the UK gas industry was examined, it  is found that British Gas had 
produced  unhelpful  and  very  high  estimates  of  it  costs,  when  introduced  to  the  prospect  of  being 
deregulated.  The  resulting  post–deregulated  market  was  characterised  by  monopolisation  and  price 
1 See Hodge (2000) for an overview of privatisation and deregulation studies.
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discrimination. In Welsby and Nichols (1999) is the privatization of Britain’s railways analysed. In 1948 
the railways was nationalised, as the government at the time saw it necessary to improve efficiency and 
modernise the railways and when this goal was reached the railways would be privatised once again. 
Privatisation was introduced in 1997 because the government wanted to create competition and relieve 
the government financially. The privatisation was done by franchising lines. It created competition about 
the franchise of the line, but resulted in monopolisation of consumers.
As  the small  sample  of  studies  suggest  there  is  no  clear  link  between  pre-  and  post-deregulation 
performance  and  profitability,  and  also  suggests  that  in  many  cases  the  deregulation  process  is 
characterised by information asymmetries. Whatever may be the case, almost all of the studies suggest 
that when the government has announced that it will deregulate and privatize, it does not turn back on its 
commitment to do so, even if the public firm suddenly turns out to have a better performance after the 
announcement. It is also noticeable that the deregulation target is not always clear, as in some cases it is 
better performance than what the public firm or firms report to the regulator, e.g. Welsby and Nichols 
(1999) and in other cases it is deregulate given the present market condition and the low performance of 
the public firm, e.g. Price (1992).
In Hodge (2000) is a thorough examination of existing studies of privatisation and deregulation around 
the  world.  An  attempt  is  also  made  to  make  a  list  of  the  deregulation  and  privatisation  goals  of 
governments around the world. The list is in short format presented in Table 1.
Table 1: Announced Deregulation and Privatization Objectives by Governments
Objective category Objective
Economic Efficiency and increased competition.
Political Funding  autonomy,  reduce  public  debt,  maximize  sales 
proceeds, and firm autonomy.
Consumer Better service and lower prices.
Other Environmental  protection,  successful  transfer  to the private 
sector and preserving the firm as a national firm.
Source: Hodge (2000;18-19) and the author.
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3. Previous theoretical work
Modelling the relation between the regulator and public firm, as an asymmetric information game, was 
first undertaken by Loeb and Magat (1979) and Byron and Myerson (1982). Regulation contracts has 
since then been extensively examined by various authors such as Laffont and Tirole (1988), Lewis and 
Sappington (1988) and (1989), Baron and besanko (1984), Dana (1993), Armstrong and Rochet (1999), 
Armstrong (1999), Laffont and Tirole (1986), and Laffont and Tirole (1990). All of these articles focus 
on the public firm being under static regulation in sense that the prospect of ever being deregulated or 
privatised is not a possibility. 
Many researchers have tried to explain the behaviour of public firms under regulation and probably just 
as many have analysed what the outcome of a particular privatization has been, but to the knowledge of 
this  author none have attempted to link the two by explaining privatization outcomes by public firm 
behaviour  during  regulation.  The  primary  concern  of  this  paper  is  therefore  to  contribute  to  the 
understanding of public firm and regulator behaviour when deregulation and privatisation is a possibility. 
It is  the opinion in this paper that the information asymmetries that causes the principal to choose high 
powered contracts  during regulation,  is  also what  causes deregulation  and privatization to  fail.  In an 
attempt to explain this and to analyze and determine the optimal regulation contracts associated with 
deregulation and privatisation,  an asymmetric  information model  is developed. The model allows the 
regulator  to  incorporate  deregulation  rents  in  the provision of  regulation  contracts  and builds  on the 
contract  framework developed for analysing regulation contracts by Laffont and Tirole (1986) among 
others. 
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4. The model and results
The first period in the deregulation model developed in this paper is similar to that developed in standard 
regulation contract models. The second period involves deregulation upon the regulator receiving a signal 
that is consistent with the announced deregulation target. The signal is the public firm’s choice of first 
period contract.  Since it  is mainly the second period that differs from the standard regulation model, 
specification of the second period payoff function of the public firm is of particular interest. It assumed 
that the public firm can be either a low cost type denoted L, and a high cost type denoted H. 
Second period payoffs are conditional on two things: first the signal on which the principal chooses to 
deregulate  or continue to regulate  and second on the deregulated market  entry firms’  marginal  costs. 
Looking at the second condition first we assume that in the deregulated market the second period relevant 
prices are derived from the standard equilibrium conditions arising from Bertrand competition. Assuming 
Bertrand competition  helps  to  simplify  the problem,  as  Bertrand competition  imply that  in  optimum 
prices are either equal to entrant’s costs, denoted by ec , i.e. ei cp =  so far as ie cc >  for { }HLi ,∈ , or be 
equal to the public firm type’s marginal costs, i.e.  ii cp = , so far as  ie cc = , implying that the public 
firm’s costs are either equal to the entrant firms’ costs or infinitesimally lower. The payoff function for a 
type i firm is defined as.
0)()()(2 ≥−= eieii cqccppi
eq. 1
It is assumed that the realised deregulation outcome is within the set of feasible outcomes available to the 
principal in the regulation period. The information available to the principal about entrant costs in the 
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deregulation period is assumed to be common knowledge. We will later on consider what happens if this 
is not the case. We can now turn the attention to the incentive constraints of the public firm types.
4.1 Incentive constraints of the firm
When the principal chooses to deregulate on a signal based on the contract chosen by the agent in the first 
period, the principal is in a sense choosing a specific second period contract for the agent to consider at 
the same time. It is assumed that the principal does not change deregulation signal, after the agent has 
chosen a specific contract, to imitate that the regulator is committed to deregulate.
In the same way as when only regulation contracts  are possible the principal’s choice imply in-optimal 
contracting, although the degree of in-optimality depends on the deregulation market entrant firms’ cost 
as well. 
The principal must decide which deregulation target it is going to be. And then commit on deregulating 
with  the  chosen  target.  It  is  further  assumed  that  the  principal,  when  not  receiving  the  signal  for 
deregulation, will not use the revealed information to design a signal consistent contract, but repeat the 
static first  period contract,  a part  from being consistent with the optimal  dynamic regulation contract 
behaviour  of  the  principal  of  the  standard  models,  see  Byron  and Myerson  (1982),  it  also  helps  to 
simplify the model. The limited reactions available to the regulator implies that we only have to consider 
four incentive constraints: two for each type depending on whether the first period signal is of type H or 
L, i.e. denoted as respectively )( Hcqs =  and )( Lcqs = .
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A. Type H firm:
Assumption: Assume that the regulator do not use first period signal to design the second period contract 
for the type L firm and that it  will deregulate if the signal  )( Hcqs =  is observed, i.e. if a high type 
incentive compatible contract is chosen.
[ ]
[ ])()1()()()(
)()()()()(
LHLeHeHHH
LHLLHLeHeHHH
cqcTcqcccqcT
cqcTcqcTcqcccqcT
−+≥−+−
−+−≥−+−
δδ
δδ

eq. 2
Assumption:  Assume that the regulator do not use the first period signal to design the second period 
contract for the type L firm and that it will deregulate if the signal )( Lcqs =  is observed, i.e. if the low 
type incentive compatible contract is chosen.
[ ]
[ ] )()()()()1(
)()()()()(
eHeLHLHHH
eHeLHLHHHHHH
cqcccqcTcqcT
cqcccqcTcqcTcqcT
−+−≥−+
−+−≥−+−
δδ
δδ

eq. 3
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B. Type L firm:
Assumption: Assume that the regulator do not use first period signal to design the second period contract 
for the type L firm and that it will deregulate if the signal  )( Hcqs =  is observed, i.e. if the high type 
incentive compatible contract is chosen.
[ ]
)()()())()(1(
)()()()()(
eLeHLHLLL
eLeHLHLLLLLL
cqcccqcTcqcT
cqcccqcTcqcTcqcT
−+−≥−−
−+−≥−+−
δδ
δδ

eq. 4
Assumption: Assume that the regulator do not use first period signal to design the second period contract 
for the type L firm and that it will deregulate if the signal  )( Lcqs =  is observed, i.e. if the low type 
incentive compatible contract is chosen.
[ ]
[ ])()1()()()(
)()()()()(
HLHeLeLLL
HLHHLHeLeLLL
cqcTcqcccqcT
cqcTcqcTcqcccqcT
−+≥−+−
−+−≥−+−
δδ
δδ

eq. 5
The next step is to characterise the agent’s information rents.
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4.1 Characterisation of the agent’s information rents
If the public firm type i mimic type j it will receive rents, i,j=L,H. The information rents associated with 
for example expecting to find that the public firm is a type H firm but it turn out to be a type L is the net 
difference between the left hand side of firm H’s incentive constraint less the right hand side of firm type 
L’s incentive constraint. An agent would get the rents of the mimicked type and any rents due to the 
difference in information between the principal and the agent, i.e. the information rents.
Since we have two cases of use of information by the principal we have four information rent equations to 
specify, two for each firm type. 
Assumption: Assume that the regulator do not use first period signal to design the second period contract 
for the type L firm and that it will deregulate if the signal  )( Hcqs =  is observed, i.e. if the high type 
incentive compatible contract is chosen. 
If H mimics L the rents of H can be written as,
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] )()1()()1()()1()()1()()1(
;)()1(
)()1()()1(
LcLLHLLcLLLLHL
LHcLc
LLLLHL
cqRcqcTcqcqcTcqcT
cccqAB
AB
B
cqcT
A
cqcT
∆+−=−+⇔∆+−−+=−+
⇓
−≡∆∆+−=∆
⇓
∆+−+=−+
δδδδδ
δ
δδ
eq. 6
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Rents of firm type L are [ ])()1( LLLL cqcTR −+= δ  . The transfer is,
)(
1 LL
L
L cqc
RT +
+
=
δ
eq. 7
In the case when the type L firm mimics H, the rents of type L can be written as,
[ ])()()()()(
)()()()()()()()(
)()(
)()()()()()(
eHcHeLeHLH
ecHceHeHHHeLeHLH
ecHc
eHeHHHeLeHLH
cqcqRcqcccqcT
cqcqcqcccqcTcqcccqcT
cqcqAB
AB
B
cqcccqcT
A
cqcccqcT
δδ
δδδ
δ
δδ
+∆+=−+−
∆+∆+−+−=−+−
⇓
∆+∆=∆
⇓
∆+−+−=−+−

eq. 8
Rents of firm type H are )()()( eHeHHHH cqcccqcTR −+−= δ . The transfer is,
)()()( eeHHHHH cqcccqcRT −++= δ
eq. 9
Assumption: Assume that the regulator do not use first period signal to design the second period contract 
for the type L firm and that it will deregulate if the signal  )( Lcqs =  is observed, i.e. if the low type 
incentive compatible contract is chosen. 
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If the type H firm mimics L, the rents of H can be written as,
[ ])()()()()(
)()(
)()()()()()(
)()()()()()(
eLcLeHeLHL
ecLc
eLeLLLeHeLHL
eLeLLLeHeLHL
cqcqRcqcccqcT
cqcq
cqcccqcTcqcccqcTAB
B
ABcqcccqcT
A
cqcccqcT
δδ
δ
δδ
δδ
+∆−=−+−
⇓
∆−∆−=
−+−−−+−=∆
⇓
∆+−+−=−+−
eq. 10
The transfer is,
)()()( eeLLLLL cqcccqcRT −++= δ
eq. 11
If the type L firm mimics H, the rents of L can be written as,
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] )()1()()1(
)()1()()1()()1(
)()1()()1(
HcHHLH
HcHHHHLH
HHHHLH
cqRcqcT
cqcqcTcqcTAB
B
ABcqcT
A
cqcT
∆++=−+
⇓
∆+=−+−−+=∆
⇓
∆+−+=−+
δδ
δδδ
δδ
eq. 12
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The transfer is,
)(
1 HH
H
H cqc
RT +
+
=
δ
eq. 13
A further restraint on the public firm behaviour has to be set, this relates to whether it at a given offered 
contract will choose to accept the contract or not.
4.3 Social welfare and the optimization problem of the principal
The social welfare of the principal is in the first period is defined as the consumers’ surplus subtracted the 
transfers spend to subsidise the production of the agent. In the second period regulation outcome this is 
also the case. The deregulation outcome imply that market competition determine social welfare. Market 
competition also implies that the principal has a choice between being concerned about rents or choose to 
ignore them. In this paper it is assumed that the principal does not care about firm rents in the deregulated 
market. This is in line with how some schools within antitrust economics treat the existence of rents, as a 
natural  result  from  firms  being  more  competitive  and  as  a  payoff  for  being  more  efficient  than 
competitors. If the principal disliked deregulation rents it could always regulate the level of deregulation 
rents through a corporate tax policy and use the extracted rents on social welfare improving projects.
The expected social welfare of the principal is signal dependent, thus the principal will have two different 
expected social welfare functions to optimize. Further the principal will have two states to consider, one 
for which the agent is efficient, i.e. L, with probability φ and one for which the agent is inefficient, i.e. H, 
with probability of 1-φ and 10 ≤≤ ϕ .
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Expected social welfare when the signal )( Hcqs =  is,
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]HHLLHHLL TqSTqSEWTqSTqSEW −−+−=⇒−−+−= )()1()()()1()( ϕϕϕϕ
eq. 14
Insert LT  and HT  from eq. 7 and eq. 9 in eq. 14 to get,
[ ] [ ] 


−+
+
−−−−−+−= H
L
eeHHHHLLL R
RcqcccqcqScqcqSEW )1(
1
)()()()()1()()( ϕ
δ
ϕδϕϕ
eq. 15
 
Expected social welfare when the signal )( Lcqs =  is,
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]HHLL
HHLL
TqSTqSEW
TqSTqSEW
−−+−=
⇓
−−+−=
)()1()(
)()1()(
ϕϕ
ϕϕ
eq. 16
Insert LT  and HT  from eq. 11 and eq. 13 respectively in eq. 16 to get,
[ ] [ ] 


+
−+−−−+−−−=
δ
ϕϕϕδϕ
1
)1()()()1()()()()( HLHHHeeLLLL
RRcqcqScqcccqcqSEW
eq. 17
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Eq. 15 and eq. 17 is the principal’s objective function and is the sum of expected social welfare and 
information rents.
4.4 The optimization problem of the principal
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Proposition 1. The introduction of deregulation imply the possibility of deregulation rents and compared 
to standard regulation contracts less high powered contracts.
Proof
It is impossible for the principal satisfy every participation and incentive constraint of the two types at the 
same type. This is implied by the assumption that HL cc < .
The consequence for the principal is that a choice has to be made between allowing a type H or L firm to 
earn rents. It is counterintuitive to allow L to earn zero rents and at the same time ensure that type firms 
can earn rents, also implied by the assumption above. Thus, we can ignore this case.
This gives us four cases to consider, two for each signal.
Case )( Hcqs = :
[ ] [ ]
[ ]
[ ] ceHHHceHHH
LLLLLL
LH
eHcHc
eHeHHHHLLL
LH
ccqSpcccqS
H
EW
cpcqScqS
L
EW
qq
cqcqcqcccqcqScqcqSEW
RR
∆
−
+−+=′=⇔=∆−−−−′−=
∂
∂
=⇒=′⇔=−′=
∂
∂
⇓



+
∆+∆
−−−−−+−=
⇓
≥=
ϕ
ϕδδϕδϕ
ϕ
δ
δϕδϕϕ
1
)1()(0)()()1(
)(0)(
,
1
)()()()()()()1()()(max
0,0
eq. 18
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In  the  same fashion  we proceed by deriving  the  socially  optimal  prices  if  the  deregulation  target  is 
)( Lcs = .
Case )( Lcqs = :
For the case of providing zero rents to the inefficient type and positive rents to the inefficient, the socially 
optimal prices is,
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ]
[ ] eLLLeLLL
cHHHcHH
HcHHHeeLLLLL
LH
ccqSpcccqS
L
EW
cqSpcqS
H
EW
cqcqcqScqcccqcqSEW
RR
δδδϕ
δ
ϕ
ϕδϕϕ
δϕϕδϕ
−+=′=⇒=−−−′=
∂
∂
∆+
−
+=′=⇒=∆+−−′−=
∂
∂
⇓
∆+−−−+−−−=
⇓
≥=
)1()(0)()(
)1(
1
)(0)1()()1(
)()1()()()1()()()()(
0,0
eq. 19
In summary the results of the optimization are:
Signal/focus )( Hcqs = )( Lcqs =
0,0 ≥= LH RR
LL
ceHHH
cp
cccp
=
∆
−
+−+=
ϕ
ϕδ
1
)(
)(
)1(
1
eLLL
cHH
cccp
cp
−+=
∆+
−
+=
δ
δ
ϕ
ϕ
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The deregulation contracts offered to the public firm reflects how the incorporation of deregulation in 
offered contracts affect public firm incentives. If the regulator suddenly and unexpectedly from the point 
of view of the public firm decided to deregulate without in advance announcing a deregulation target and 
on the  basis  of  pure regulation  contracts,  the result  would  be that  past  contracts  would be  too high 
powered. This would also be the case if deregulation was known in advance and the standard regulation 
contracts was not adjusted for incentives from the announced deregulation of the public firm. Thus, the 
introduction of deregulation as part of a specified contract enables the regulator to lower the incentives 
provided in the offered contract compared to the standard regulation model.
Adjusting for deregulation incentives can be done in a number of ways. One way would be to use a 
combination of regulation type contracts and rent extraction through corporate taxation policies in the 
deregulation period.
5 Separating and pooling equilibrium
Proposition 2. A separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium at the deregulation target is consistent 
with deregulation.
Proof
To determine when we have a separating or pooling equilibrium we start by determining for which values 
of ec type H contracts are equivalent to type L contracts given that the signal is )( Hcqs = ,
e
c
HeLceHHLH cccccccpp ≡
∆
−
+=⇔=∆
−
+−+⇒=
δϕϕ
ϕδ
1
1
1
)(
eq. 20
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Eq. 20 implies that firm types are indifferent between choosing a type H and a type L contract.  This 
means that we have a separating equilibrium. It also implies that  the regulator is indifferent between 
deregulating a type L or type H firm and that deregulation occur.
For values of ec different from those of eq. 20 we have
onderegulatiHatpooling
onderegulatiseparating
onderegulatinoLatpooling
ppcc LHcHe
⇒
⇒
⇒
⇒
>
=
<
⇒
∆
−
+
<
=
>
δϕ1
1
eq. 21
If we perform the same exercise for the deregulation signal )( Lcqs =  we have,
onderegulatiLatpooling
onderegulatiseparating
onderegulatinoHatpooling
ppcc LHcLe
⇒
⇒
⇒
⇒
<
=
>
⇒∆
−
++−
−
<
=
>
δϕ
δϕϕ
)1(
)1()1(
eq. 22
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This analysis has the following implications for the determination of the socially optimal deregulation 
signal.
6 Social optimal deregulation signal 
If we compare the ec needed for the regulator to deregulate as found in the previous section and if we call 
the two ec ’s found for ec and ec for respectively the ec establishing equivalence for signal  )( Hcqs = and
)( Lcqs = , we see that
eeee cccc >⇒>− 0
eq. 23
If we start be defining )( ji pS as the social welfare from the public firm choosing a contract providing a 
price  of  jp when  the  deregulation  target  is  i,j=H,L.  If  we  compare  the  offered  contracts  under  the 
different signals we see that
)()()(
)1(
)1()1(0
)()()(
)1(
)1()1(
1
1
)()(
1
1
*
*
LLLHHcLe
HLLHHcLe
c
H
c
He
cqspSpScc
cqspSpSccc
onderegulatiSregulationScc
=⇒<⇒∆
−
++−
−≤≤
=⇒≥⇒∆
−
++−
−>≥∆
−
+
>⇒
∆
−
+>
δϕ
δϕϕ
δϕ
δϕϕ
δϕ
δϕ
eq. 24
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Proposition 3. If only information about the public firm is used to determine when to deregulate, the best 
thing to do is to announce deregulation if inefficient contracts are chosen.
Proof
If the regulator is uninformed about entrant cost, it would be reasonable to expect that the regulator uses 
the  information  it  has  about  the  public  firm to  make  predictions  about  entrant  firm costs,  or  make 
expectations about entrant cost based on his beliefs about the public firm. That is the information that the 
regulated firm can be two types and the signal the public firm send about its true type by choosing one of 
the contracts offered by the regulator. The regulator’s beliefs are the probabilities assigned to the public 
firm being either inefficient or efficient.
In this case the expected entrant cost is HLe ccEc )1( ϕϕ −+= , the implication of this is that HeL cEcc ≤≤ . 
By comparing this with eq. 24 it can be seen that it implies that the optimal signal is )(* Hcqs = .
7 Game Participation
So  far  game  participation  has  been  ignored,  but  in  this  section  we  consider  the  effects  different 
participation goals may have on the results.
If we assume that firms can choose whether to participate or not given the offered set of contracts and that 
participation imply
0≥iR
eq. 25
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; { }eLHi ,,∈  indicating  that  the firms  that  will  consider  participation  is  the firm types  H and L and 
entrants. Intuitively participation depends on the size of the first period and second period deregulation 
payoff and as long as the participation condition of the high type is greater than or equal to zero first 
period participation of both types is ensured, as long as HLH cpp ≥≥ . 
We will consider three cases of participation: 1) the case where firms do not care about period profit 
being greater than zero, as long as the sum of the period profits are greater than or equal to zero, i.e. 
∑= tii RTR . Thus, firms accept a period loss as long as it is covered by the profit from the proceeding or 
preceding period; 2) the other case is where the regulator has an obligation to supply policy or public 
service requirement. This policy implies under the model settings, that the regulated firm must earn zero 
or positive rents. And 3) the regulator may employ a no shutdown policy on the former public firm.
7.1 Total period rents
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Proposition 4. A deregulation target consistent with the public firm being inefficient, imply that only high 
type contracts will ensure participation. A deregulation consistent with the public firm being efficient, 
imply that participation is ensured for high type contracts and only for certain levels of entrant costs also 
for low type contracts.
Proof
If  the  firm  only  care  about  the  total  period  rents  being  greater  than  or  equal  to  zero  this  imply
0≥−+−= ieiii cccpTR ,  where LHi ,= .  The  range  of  entrant  costs  compatible  with  this  condition 
depends on the chosen contract and the deregulation signal. 
If the deregulation target is )( Hcqs = and type L contracts are chosen it is immediately evident that type L 
contract cannot ensure participation of type H firms. Thus, we can concentrate on participation in relation 
to type H contracts.  If a type H contract  is chosen it is seen that ∞→−→ ecfor eH cp  implying that 
0→HTR and that at the limit eH cp < and further that +∈∀> RcTR eH 0 . Thus, participation is ensured for 
both firm types.
23
If the deregulation target is )( Lcqs = and type H contracts are chosen it is immediately evident that this is 
sufficient  to  ensure  participation  of  both  firm  types.  If  a  type  L  contract  is  chosen  it  is  seen  that
∞→−→ ecfor eH cp  implying  that  0→LTR and  that  at  the  limit eL cp <  and  further  that
+∈∀> RcTR eL 0 . Thus, participation of a type L firm is ensured for any value of entrant costs. With 
regard  to  the  inefficient  firm  type  participation  is  ensured  for  values  of  entrant  costs  satisfying
δ
c
Le cc
∆
−≥ .
Thus, the participation condition of total rents being greater than or equal to zero limits the possible social 
optimal outcome space for both deregulation targets.
7.2 Obligation to supply
Proposition  4.  An  obligation  to  supply  is  inconsistent  with  a  deregulation  target  of )( Lcqs = ,  but 
consistent with a deregulation target of )( Hcqs =  and further optimal for values of entrant cost within the 
range cLecH ccc ∆
−
++−
−>≥∆
−
+
δϕ
δϕϕ
δϕ )1(
)1()1(
1
1
.
Proof
If  the  regulator  employs  an obligation  to supply policy,  it  implies  that  the participation  constraint  is 
binding whenever the firm is regulated. This reflects the difference between public service requirements 
and  the  goals  of  deregulation,  the  principal  is  assumed  to  only  be  concerned  about  first  period 
participation. Participation in the deregulated market is in a sense always ensured in the model, it is either 
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ensured by the former public firm or by an entrant firm. In light of this you can say that we have partial 
participation of the public firm if it only participates in the first period.
A supply obligation means that irrespective of firm type the regulator must ensure that the firm produces. 
Thus,  the regulator  must  provide contracts  that  respect  the participation condition irrespective of the 
deregulation signal. Given that the firm can be of either a high or a low cost type any contract that ensures 
participation of the high cost type will also ensure participation of the L type. 
It is immediately seen that the range of entrant costs compatible with an obligation to supply given a 
deregulation signal of )( Hcqs = and given a type L contract is chosen cannot ensure participation of type 
H firms. Thus, we can concentrate on participation in relation to type H contracts.
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eHH cccccccp >⇒>
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δδϕ
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Eq.  26
; pec is the entrant cost level compatible with participation.
It is seen from eq. 26 that it is consistent with deregulation, though if it is further required to be within the 
range given in eq. 24 it will also be optimal.
If we turn to the range of entrant costs compatible with an obligation to supply given a deregulation signal 
of )( Lcqs = it is seen that whenever a type H contract is chosen participation of both types is ensured. If a 
type L contract is chosen the range of entrant costs is
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Comparing this with eq. 22 it is seen that participation will make pooling at H the only possible solution. 
This implies that the deregulation target is inconsistent with first period participation and deregulation in 
the second period.
7.3 No shutdown policy
Proposition  5.  A no shutdown policy for  the contracting  firm in both periods  is  inconsistent  with a 
deregulation target of )( Lcqs = , but consistent with a target of  )( Hcqs =  for values of entrant costs of 
He cc ≥ .
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Proof
A no shutdown policy in both periods implies { }2,10, ,, ∈∀≥ tRR tLtH . The minimum value of ec fulfilling 
this requirement is He cc = . Comparing this with the results of eq. 24 the optimal signal is )( Hcqs = . A no 
shutdown policy  is  consistent  with  values  of  entrant  costs  of He cc ≥ .  The  policy  limits  the  socially 
optimal outcome space, available contracts and strategies of the regulator. If the realised entrant costs are 
He cc <  the participation requirement is unobtainable and the no shutdown policy is impossible to uphold, 
unless the regulator continues to fund the public firm even after deregulation.
8 Conclusion
Incorporating deregulation as a variable in contract set up to regulated firms changes the incentives that 
the  public  firm has.  It  should  also  induce  regulators  to  rethink  regulation  contracts  and  incorporate 
probable  deregulation  rents  available  to  the  firm  types.  If  the  regulator  do  so  it  implies  regulation 
contracts that provide less incentive to the public firm compared to standard regulation contracts.
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When regulators use public firm types as a projection of deregulation outcome it limits the possible social 
optimal  outcome  space  and  require  that  the  regulator  uses  the  inefficient  firm  type  contracts  as 
deregulation target. Deregulation increases the ways that the regulator can perceive and use participation 
policy. The different views have pronounced effects on the possible optimal social outcome space. The 
most limiting effect on outcome space is when the regulator has an obligation to supply policy and the 
least limiting effects has a laissez faire participation policy, where the firm considers the sum of period 
rents  as the participation condition.  As assumed in  the model  the regulator  can choose between two 
deregulation targets reflecting different points of view on when deregulation should be performed from a 
political  point  of  view.  In  the context  of  the model  and given the  different  participation  targets,  the 
deregulation target that is most likely to be consistent with socially optimal deregulation, is to deregulate 
if the public firm chooses an inefficient firm type contract.
The findings of this paper suggest that regulators should be aware of the effects of probable deregulation 
on  public  firm  incentives  when  designing  regulation  contracts.  The  findings  also  suggest  that  the 
deregulation target and participation policy should be chosen with great care and by carefully assessing 
the most probable deregulation outcome.
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